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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of the Case 
This case is on appeal from the Idaho District Court for the First Judicial District Court, 
Bonner County. Appellant, "Terry-Lee," a prose litigant, appeals denial of his various motions 
to set aside a default judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On May 9, 2009, Appellant Terry-Lee ("Lee") filed an action for dissolution of his 
partnership with Respondent, Nathan David Young ("Young")1 ("Complaint"). On June 8, 2009, 
Defendant Young voluntarily appeared2 and thereafter filed his Answer, Affirmative Defenses, 
and Counterclaim against Lee on November 10, 20093 ("Counterclaim"). Lee failed to file a 
Reply, and on December 15, 2009, Young provided Lee with a three-day notice of intent to take 
default.4 Lee still failed to file a Reply, and an Order for Entry of Default was entered on 
January 5, 2010. 5 
On May 12, 2010, Young moved for entry of Default Judgment against Lee.6 On June 2, 
2010, Young's Motion was granted and Judgment entered against Lee.7 On June 11, 2010, Lee 
requested that the default judgment be set aside, which he entitled "By Forced Attendance 
1 R., Vol. 1, p 1-7 (the Complaint was captioned "Dissolution of Partnership and Division of 
Real Property's in Bonner County" (hereinafter "Complaint")). 
2 R., Vol. 1, p 8-9. 
3 R. Vol. 1, p. 18-30. 
4 R. Vol. 1, p. 31-32. 
5 R. Vol. 1, p. 67-68 
6 Vol. 1, p. 79-87. 
7 Vol. 1, p. 99-102. 
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Motion to Vacate Judgment and to Vacate transfer of the undivided half interest of the Land(s) in 
question against the State created Trust TERRY LEE for Cause and for Fraud against the court 
and against Terry-Lee The Sovereign Being for Rule 60(b) by and thru your Rule 59(b), and Rule 
26(e)(2), and Rule 9(b). "8 Young filed his opposition,9 and on September 30, 2010, the trial 
court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motions. 10 Mr. Lee 
thereafter filed a number of documents with varying captions "objecting to" and "taking 
acceptions to" the Memorandum decision. 11 Young opposed the filings on January 5, 2011 on 
the basis that they were untimely and prohibited under I.R.C.P. Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) ("shall" not 
seek reconsideration of denial of most post-judgment motions, including Rules 60(a) and 60(b) 
reconsideration motions). 12 The Court considered Lee's filings anyway, and on March 9, 2011, 
permitted Mr. Lee to proceed with a motion to reconsider. 13 Lee again busied himself with filing 
of various documents totaling over 100 pages. 14 A hearing was held on April 12, 2011, which 
Young's counsel did not attend. 15 The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order 
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Other Motions on May 7, 2011. 16 Lee 
thereafter appealed. 17 
8 Vol.1,p. 106-113. 
9 Vol. 1, p. 116-117; 118-121. 
10 I Vo. l,p.179-183. 
11 Vol. 1, p. 184-194, 195-206 
12 Vol. 2, p. 227-229. 
13 Vol. 1, p. 394-395 
14 Vol. 3, p. 398-499. 
15 Vol. 3, p. 500-507, 508-522. 
16 Vol. 3, p. 508-522. 
17 Vol. 3, p. 527-540. 
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C. Statement of the Facts 
1. Lee and Young entered into a partnership agreement, their relationship deteriorated, 
Lee sued for dissolution, and Young counterclaimed for breaches of their partnership agreement, 
wrongful dissociation, and an accounting. 18 
2. After Young brought his Counterclaim against Lee, Lee failed to file a Reply. 19 No 
Reply or denials of Young's Counterclaim have ever been filed that comply with I.R.C.P. Rule 
8(b ).20 
3. Lee opted to reject and return mail that was delivered to him as a part of the subject 
litigation because, among other things, he apparently objected to Respondent's use of a zip code 
on the envelopes, and/or wanted his name to be capitalized, include a hyphen, and contain 
various statements about his sovereignty before he would recognize it as being his own.21 
4. During the September 29, 2010 hearing on Lee's motions to reconsider and/or vacate, 
Mr. Lee argued he is not required to open mail that lists a zip code, and stated as a part of his 
opening argument to the court: 
"[I]s there any law requiring me to open someone else's mail to see if it is 
applicable to me, or is there any law that requires me to be in a zip code area?"22 
18 Vol. 1, p. 1-7 (Lee's Complaint); p. 18-30 (Young's Counterclaim). 
19 R. Vol. 1, p. 64-66 
20 See Record Volumes 1-3. 
21 See Affidavit of Michael Schmidt [Attached to Young's Motion to Augment], and attached 
Exhibits. 
22 Transcript on Appeal, September 29, 2010 "Motions" hearing, p. 15, In. 17-20. 
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5. Lee further argued during the September 29, 2010 hearing on his various motions as 
follows: 
I sent notice after notice after notice to this attorney here to correct these errors 
and dishonors and to come forward correctly, and he would not do so, so I was 
not afforded the opportunity to participate because I was asked to open 
somebody else's mail and somebody else's post to see if it was mine or not, 
and I don't do that. There's no law requiring me to do that. 
Now, if he would've sent it to my correct name, which Nathoo David knew 
from the beginning of our contract, we wouldn't have this discussion right 
now. I would've been at the last hearing, and I would've been able to properly 
rebut any claim of judgment, so I'm asking that the judgment be vacated because 
due process wasn't followed to protect my rights.23 
6. Lee's court filings demonstrate an ideological alignment with the "sovereign citizen" 
movement, as he frequently references his own identity as a "sovereign being," and also 
repeatedly references the Bible/Christianity, U.S. Constitution, U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, 
utilizes personal names spelled in all capital letters and interspersed with odd punctuation, 
utilizes signatures followed by words like "under duress," "Sovereign Citizen," and frequently 
cautions that he does not recognize state or federal law in one respect or another because of his 
perceived unique "flesh and blood body" that is not a fictional corporation or created "trust. "24 
23 Transcript on Appeal, September 29, 2010 "Motions" hearing, p. 20, In. 6-20 ( emphasis 
added). 
24 See generally, all documents filed by Lee in this matter; As a point of interest, see also 
"Sovereign Citizens, A Growing Domestic Threat to Law Enforcement, by FBI Counterterrorism 
Analysis Section, available at: http://www.tbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-
bulletin/september-20 I I/sovereign-citizens 
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7. A Default Order and Judgment were entered against Lee.25 Lee sought to set it 
aside.26 The trial court determined that it is not "excusable neglect" to refuse to accept mail, and 
that Mr. Lee could therefore not set the judgment entered against him aside.27 
8. The address to which the Three (3) Day Notice of Intent to Take Default and Default 
Judgment was sent on December 15, 2009 is as follows: 
Terry-Lee 
c/o P.O. Box 1084 
Loon-Lake, Washington 9914828 
9. Mr. Lee listed his Address in the upper left hand comer of his Complaint as follows: 
Terry-Lee, a Sovereign Being 
c/o [Box 1084] 
Loon-Lake,non-domestic 
W h. d · 29 as mgton state, eJure 
10. Mr. Lee refused to open his mail when it listed a zip code based on a belief that it 
would somehow taint his status as a Christian "sovereign being" and subject him to a 
governmental identity he rejects.30 It was not apparent for several months that Lee's vague 
filings and "sovereign-being" rhetoric were in objection to the use of a zip code, nor was it 
25 R. Vol. 1, p. 67-68 (Order); R. Vol. 1, p. 99-102 (Judgment). 
26 R. Vol. 1, p. 103-115. 
27 R. Vol. 1, p. 176-183. 
28 See affidavit of Michael Schmidt [Attached to Young's Motion to Augment], at Exhibit D. 
29 R. Vol. 1, p. 1. 
30 See, e.g., R. Vol. 1, p. 16 ("I live inside my Earthly body and I domicile on the soil inside the 
Dejure Sureyed state of Washington. I do not live in a U.S. District nor do I participate with any 
Zip code area, I am from a different Venue and Different Jurisdiction than you are ... You are 
instructed to send all Post that I may need to revue to my correct Location and that Location 
only."), and Vol. 11, p. 180 (stating in open court to Judge Mitchell "ls there any law requiring 
me to open someone else's mail.") 
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apparent why he would return all letters sent to his address unopened. This type of sovereign-
being-name-game is intentionally confusing by design.31 
11. Lee returned the Three (3) Day Notice of Intent to Take Default and Default 
Judgment to Plaintiff's attorneys unopened.32 
12. Lee also returned unopened the January 5, 2009 Order for Entry of Default in an 
envelope with inadequate postage, listing the addressee and return addresses as Lukins & Annis 
(so Plaintiff's attorneys had to pay), with a note stating, "No Such Built Legal Fiction Implied 
Trust at our Location whatsoever." 33 
13. Lee also returned unopened the Motion for Entry of Judgment (again in an envelope 
with insufficient postage) with a note stating: 
Why, Do you people Keep "intruding" on my space with Post addressed to some 
state created Legally "Built" Fiction Trust, when in fact I The Sovereign Being 
have no contract whatsoever with any such "trust" nor any contract with any 
corporate state ( or Agency thereof)? If you continue to assault me with these 
Trespasses you will be giving me permission to sue you by Due process of "Law" 
5-l 8-AD2010. You are in Trespass and Dishonor! 34 
31 See, e.g., 'Sovereign Citizens' Raising Concerns, Bonner County Daily Bee, July 30, 2011. 
("To circumvent financial obligations, sovereign citizens have been known to alter their names ... 
They might insert random punctuation marks or alter the name in other ways. The change 
creates a loophole that a citizen can exploit. If you owe any money, and it's in your birth 
certificate name, you don't have to pay it...A sovereign citizen's most common weapon is 
paperwork - strange declarations or multi-page statements, written in confusing legalese." 
Available at: http://www.bonnercountydailybee.com/news/local/article 1 f62tnc6-ba70-11 e0-
bbf6-001 cc4c002e0 .html 
32 See Affidavit of Michael Schmidt [Attached to Young's Motion to Augment], and attached 
Exhibit D (returned 3-day Notice and Notice of Change of Address). 
33 Id. at Exhibit G. 
34 Id at Exhibit K. 
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14. Lee also returned unopened the January 4, 2010 Motion and Affidavit for Entry of 
Default dated January 4, 2010, inside of an envelope (again with inadequate postage so 
Plaintiffs attorneys had to pay), with a note stating, "No Such 'Built Legal fiction Implied Trust' 
at our Location.!! What so ever!!"35 
15. Mr. Lee refused to open his mail (and continues to refuse his mail) because 
something on the envelope containing the documents being served was not precisely as he felt it 
should be. He would typically return the refused mail in a larger envelope, covered in sovereign 
citizen rhetoric, listing Lukins & Annis P.S. 's address as both the return address and the mailing 
address. Additionally, he would only affix one or two cents worth of postage, which forced 
Young's attorneys to pay the mailman the missing postage - all for the privilege of receiving 
Lee's unopened maii.36 
12. Lee was provided notice of all Motions and other court filings as indicated in the 
corresponding Certificates of Service contained in the record before this Court. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court properly reject Lee's requests to set aside the default judgment taken 
against Mr. Lee? 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Young seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3) and 12-121. Idaho 
Code§ 12-120(3) requires an award of fees on appeal where the action involves a "commercial 
35 Id. at Exhibit I. 
36 See, e.g., Affidavit of Michael Schmidt [Attached to Young's Motion to Augment], and 
attached Exhibits. 
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transaction," which is defined as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household 
purposes." Id.; Farrell v. Whiteman, 152 Idaho 190, 196, 268 P.3d 458, (2012). This case 
constitutes a "commercial transaction" related to a breach of partnership agreement,37 and an 
action for wrongful dissolution.38 
Attorneys fees are also proper under Idaho Code§ 12-121 because this action was 
appealed frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. An appeal is deemed to be 
frivolous where an appellant makes no substantial showing that the lower court misapplied the 
law. Wolske Bros. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Co., 116 Idaho 714, 716, 779 P.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1989). 
In this case, Lee has failed to articulate any grounds under I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) for setting the 
Judgment aside (which he also failed to do before the trial court). And while Rule 60(b) appears 
to have been mentioned twice in Lee's briefing, it is hidden among irrelevant legal citations with 
quotations that are taken out of context, misused, and distorted in unintelligible legal argument. 
The repeated filing of incomprehensible motions which lack any basis in law justifies an award 
of fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121. Pro Indiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Trust, 131 
Idaho 741,747,963 P.2d 1178 (1998). 
Lee's appeal is frivolous and pursued without any showing that the lower court 
misapplied the law. Young therefore respectfully requests that fees and costs be awarded on this 
appeal. 
37 R. Vol. 1, p 24, ,r, 20-24. 
38 R. Vol. I, p 23-24, ,r,r 16-19. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
"The decision whether to grant a motion to set aside a default judgment, pursuant to Rule 
55(c) and Rule 60(b), 1.R.C.P., is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Such a 
decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 
Idaho 525,527, 757, P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1988). "This Court will not disturb a trial court's 
exercise of discretion absent a clear showing of abuse. Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 
596,599, 21 P.3d 918 (2001) (citing State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784,791,932 P.2d 907,914 
(Ct.App.1997)). 
When reviewing an exercise of discretion on appeal, the Court must conduct a multi-
tiered inquiry to determine: 
Id. 
(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the court acted within the outer bounds of such discretion and consistently with legal 
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason. 
"If a trial judge, when ruling on a Rule 60(b)(l) motion, makes findings of fact that are 
not clearly erroneous, applies the proper criteria under the rules to those facts, favoring relief in 
doubtful cases, and reaches a decision that follows logically from application of such criteria to 
the facts found, then the judge will be deemed to have acted within his sound discretion. " Fisher 
v. Crest Corp., 112 Idaho 741, 745, 735 P.2d 1052 (Ct. App. 1987). 
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In the present case, Judge Mitchell made numerous findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in both of his Memorandum Decisions denying the motions for reconsideration.39 Said 
Memorandum decisions include twenty-three pages of findings of fact and well-reasoned opinion 
which sets forth the factual and procedural history of the case, and then finds that "Refusing to 
accept mail and returning any correspondence utilizing a zip code is not acting as a reasonably 
prudent person would under similar circumstances. "40 It was on this basis that Lee's Motions 
were denied. Because the trial Court did not abuse its discretion, Young requests that Lee's 
appeal be denied. 
B. Refusal to Open Mail Does Not Constitute "Excusable Neglect" Under 
I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b). 
"The requirements for setting aside a default judgment are two-fold: first, the moving 
party must satisfy at least one of the criteria of Rule 60(b)(l); second, he must allege facts which, 
if established, would constitute a meritorious defense to the action." Clark v. Atwood, 112 Idaho 
115, 117, 730 P.2d 1035 (Ct. App. 1986). Rule 60(b) requires the trial court to examine whether 
the defaulted party's conduct and neglect was excusable. Id. This requires that the moving party 
demonstrate that his neglectful conduct was of a type expected from a reasonably prudent person 
under the circumstances. Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 599, 21 P.3d 918 (2001); 
Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co., 104 Idaho 727, 662 P.2d 1171 (Ct.App. 1983); Gro-Mor, Inc. v. 
Butts, 109 Idaho 1020, 712 P.2d 721 (Ct.App.1985). When a statute or rule speaks in terms of 
39 See, September 30, 2010 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motions, R. 
Vol. 1, p. 176-183; May 17, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion 
for Reconsideration and Other Motions, Vol. 3, p. 508-522. 
40 R. Vol. 3, p. 515. 
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the "reasonableness" of the losing party's actions, it "implies a measure of objectivity ... which 
is properly left to the district court's reasoned judgment." City of Osburn v. Randel,_ P.3d _, 
_ (2012) (not yet reported, available at http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/Osbum%2037965.pdf). 
The trial court in this matter did not abuse its discretion. As the trial court noted, 
receiving and then refusing mail is not acting as a reasonably prudent person would under similar 
circumstances."41 While Lee is free to live in his own "sovereign citizen" reality -where zip 
codes are repulsive, and names are uniquely punctuated and capitalized it would be 
inappropriate to force the rest of the legal community to play by such a personal and unique set 
of rules. The rules of litigation are set by the Courts and Rules of Civil Procedure - not the 
litigants or their personal beliefs. Were it otherwise, a litigant might simply change their name to 
an unpronounceable artistic symbol like "The Artist Formerly Known as Prince" did when he 
changed his name to lf<. 
Additionally, Lee's conduct in receiving and returning mail unopened is not "prudent" -
especially in light of the fact that it was Lee who availed himself to the courts by beginning the 
litigation in the first place. A prudent person involved in litigation would open mail received 
from opposing counsel that was clearly directed at him. Additionally, a prudent person who 
chooses to refuse mail from opposing counsel because of a unique ideology should still visit the 
court to make copies of whatever it was that he rejected in the mail. A failure to act prudently 
41 R. Vol. 1, p. 181. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 11 
L:\y\young027434\0000 I \Appeal\ Young Response Brief.docx 
and reasonably could and ultimately did - have adverse implications. Having failed to act 
reasonably and prudently, Lee cannot be heard to complain. 
In Ray v. Swanson Realty, LLC, 2010 WL 2074860 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2010), a default was 
entered against a defendant who refused to open mail containing notice of intent to seek a 
default. Instead of opening it, she wrote "return to sender" on it, and placed it back into the mail. 
The trial court granted the plaintiff a default judgment. The defendant subsequently filed a 
motion to set aside the default judgment, which motion was denied by the trial court. The 
defendant appealed and argued that she did not receive actual notice of the motion for default, 
and that the trial court should have granted her motion to set it aside because of mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Id at p. 1. In rejecting her argument, the Ray Court 
explained: 
Plaintiffs sent her the notice of the motion for default judgment by means 
reasonably calculated to provide notice. Thus, Plaintiffs correctly served her in 
accordance with the requirement of [Civil Rule 5], and she cannot be heard to 
claim that the method used to notify her was defective. 
To the contrary, the notice was, in fact, delivered to her. Consequently, Ms. Ray 
did receive actual notice. She simply chose to ignore it by not opening the 
envelope and sending it back. These actions, being willful, do not fall within the 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" ground for setting aside a 
default judgment. 
Further, we decline to hold that individuals could avoid or delay legal liability 
by simply refusing to read or respond to communications sent by adverse 
parties. Ms. Ray has failed to meet the requirements for setting aside a default 
judgment. In sum, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying her motion. 
Id. at pp. 2-3 ( emphasis added). 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 12 
L:\y\young027434\0000 I \Appeal\ Young Response Briefdocx 
In Rodell v. Nelson, the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to overturn the trial court's 
determination that a default judgment should not be set aside where a process server was 
attacked by dogs as he attempted to serve a copy of an order for the withdrawal of defendant's 
attorney, and where a certified mailing to the defendant was returned unclaimed. 113 Idaho 945, 
947, 750 P.2d 966 (Ct.App. 1988). The Radel Court stated: 
Id. 
It is a well-settled general principle that a person has no right to shut his eyes or 
ears to information and then to say that he lacked notice of the avoided facts. As 
a corollary to that principle, a person may not avoid the effect of a written notice 
by refusing service of the notice. 
Lee failed to act prudently and reasonably, and his appeal should be denied. 
C. Lee Failed to Plead a Meritorious Defense to the Action. 
In addition to the requirement that a reason under Rule 60(b) be set forth, a party moving 
to set aside a default judgment "must allege facts which, if established, would constitute a 
meritorious defense to the action." Clark v. Atwood, 112 Idaho 115, 117, 730 P.2d 1035 (Ct. 
App. 1986). "Idaho case law requires a party seeking to set aside a default judgment to show a 
meritorious defense." McFarland v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 931, 934, 854 P.2d 2 (Ct. App. 1993). A 
necessary part of establishing a meritorious defense would include the filing of a "Reply" in 
conformance with the requirements of l.R.C.P. Rule 8(b). No such document was filed, and no 
such document appears in the Record. 
"A verments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required ... are admitted 
when not denied in the responsive pleading." I.R.C.P. Rule 8(d). Since Lee has failed to file a 
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Reply at all, he has not demonstrated a meritorious defense. Lee's appeal should therefore be 
denied. 
D. Lee Failed to Timely Appeal. 
Under I.A.R. Rule 14, a litigant must physically file a notice of appeal with the clerk of 
the court within 42 days from the clerk's stamp on the appealable judgment or order. Id. The 
trial court in this matter entered its Judgment against Terry-Lee on June 2, 2010. This was an 
appealable and final judgment, which Lee moved to vacate and reconsider (via many court 
filings with varying names, including "Motion to Vacate ... "42 "Writ of' Habeus Corpus Cum 
Causa' .. .',43 and "Objections and Denials ... "44). While these court filings have unusual captions, 
they were essentially motions to vacate the default judgment, or documents filed in support of 
this motion. 
Under l.R.C.P. Rule 1 l(a)(2): 
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made 
at any time before the entry of final judgment, but not later than fourteen ( 14) days after 
the entry of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial 
court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the 
entry of such order; provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an 
order of the trial court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 
59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b). 
Id (emphasis added). 
42 1 R. Vo. 1, p. 106-113. 
43 R. Vol. 1, p. 112-115. 
44 R. Vol. 1, p. 135-148 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 14 
L:\y\young027434\0000 I \Appeal\ Young Response Brief.docx 
While it is difficult to categorize Lee's colorfully-named court filings, he has spared us at 
least some of that burden by categorizing them himself. In his appeal brief, Lee admits that after 
the Judgment was entered: 
I then noted up a hearing to vacate the judgment and set a trial date. Judge 
Mitchell denied my Motion to vacate the Judgment and to set a trial date, so I 
immediately presented a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied. I 
then presented a second Motion for Reconsideration, in a timely manner, which 
he also denied."45 
Where an I.R.C.P. Rule 60 Motion is brought by a defaulted party, he is not afforded an 
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the denial. I.R.C.P. Rule 1 l(a)(2). Additionally, motions 
under I.R.C.P. Rule 60 do not terminate the running of the 42-day period for appeal. I.A.R. Rule 
14(a). If a Rule 60 Motion does not toll running of the 42-day appeal period, then neither can a 
motion to reconsider such denial. In fact, an I.R.C.P. Rule 1 l(a)(2) motion to reconsider an 
adverse ruling based on Rule 60 is not even authorized. 
While nothing prohibits a trial court from considering Rule 60 and Rule l l(a)(2) Motions 
(and motions for fees or costs) during the running of the appeal period, the pendency of those 
motions does not stop the running of the appeal period. I.AR. Rule 14(a). Lee's decision to 
wait until after the entry of various court orders and decisions on his Motion to Vacate, Motion 
to Reconsider, and second Motion to Reconsider were entered is fatal to his appeal. The 
Judgment was entered by default on June 2, 2010.46 Lee moved to vacate that Judgment within 
45 Appellant's Brief at p. 13. 
46 R. Vol. I, p. 99-102. 
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10 days,47 which Motion was denied on September 30, 2011.48 Lee then brought other motions, 
which were denied.49 Lee continued filing motions and documents with the Court, which were 
denied on May 7, 2011.50 While the trial court decided those motions on the merits, it could 
have (and perhaps should have) decided them under Rule 1 l(a)(2), which prohibits motions for 
reconsideration under Rule 60.51 Lee's appeal was untimely, and should therefore be dismissed 
and denied. 
E. Lee's Forty-Two (42) Issues on Appeal are Without Merit, Lack Adequate 
Citation to the Record, Fail to Cite to Relevant Authority, and are Largely 
Incomprehensible. 
Lee takes issue with many things he believes are improper with the court system, the 
47 R. Vol. 1, p. 106-113. 
48 l R. Vo. 1, p. 176-183. 
49 R. Vol. 2, p. 194-394. 
50 R. Vol. 3, p. 508-522. 
51 This was briefed by Young to the trial Court as follows: 
Mr. Lee's request for relief from the Judgment or reconsideration of any judgment in this 
matter, is untimely under I.R.C.P. Rule l l(a)(2)(B). Said Rule requires motions for 
reconsideration to be filed within 14 days after entry of final judgment. Said Rule also 
prohibits such motions for reconsideration under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59.1, 60(a), 
and 60(b). 
The original Default Judgment was entered on June 2, 20 I 0. A request to vacate the 
Judgment was filed thereafter on June 11, 2010. Hearing was later scheduled for September 
29, 2010. A hearing was held and arguments presented by Plaintiff and Defendant. A 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motions was entered on September 
30, 2010. Mr. Lee's request is essentially one for reconsideration of the Default Judgment 
and denial of his request to vacate the Judgment under Rules 55(c), 60(a) and/or 60(b). As 
such, his current "objection" to the Court's ruling is prohibited by Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B). 
R. Vol. 2. P. 228. 
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presiding judges, counsel, and the government at large. He lists 42 separate issues on appeal.52 
However, almost all relate to alleged facts that might support his claims - claims which he lost 
his ability to contest when he decided to return mail instead of opening it and a default was 
entered. Many are simply incomprehensible, or are made incomprehensible by their failure to 
cite to the record or relevant legal authority. Where Lee does cite to the record in support of a 
factual matter, the citation typically does not in fact support the claimed factual matter, or simply 
cities to more of Lee's unenlightening rhetoric. Likewise, when Lee cites to alleged legal 
authority, the citation is not to a specific page or excerpt, but instead cites to the case or statute 
only generally. Additionally, the authority - even read broadly -- does not in fact state the 
proposition argued by Lee, or if it does, Lee fails to analyze and apply the proposition to the facts 
of the case. 
"Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an 
attorney." Minor Miracle Productions, LLC v. Starkey, 152 Idaho 333, 336, 271 P.3d 1189 
(2012). Under I.A.R. Rule 35(a)( 4 ), a party must list the issues presented on appeal "in the terms 
and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement of the issues should 
be short and concise, and should not be repetitious. The issues shall fairly state the issues 
presented for review." Id. 
Lee's stream-of-consciousness pseudo-legalese does not meet the requirements of I.A.R. 
Rule 35(a)(4), and does not meet the "same standards" that would be applicable to an attorney. 
The statement of issues is not short and concise, it is repetitious, and it does not fairly state the 
52 Appellant's Brief, p. 16-30. 
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issues presented for appeal. Lee's statement of issues on appeal reads more like an affidavit full 
of conclusions of fact and law that are not supported by the record. 
If one were forced to translate his statements of issues, it appears most attempt to assert 
that there was a failure by the trial court to consider numerous pieces of evidence he wanted to 
introduce at trial. What Lee fails to properly state as an issue, and brief on appeal, is where the 
trial court erred in its conclusions of law and statements of fact refusing to vacate the default 
judgment. Once that is addressed, Lee might be in a better position to complain about being 
denied a trial. 
The statement of facts, as well as the "Argument" section of Lee's brief do not address 
what is important. Judge Mitchell drafted two very thorough and concise Memorandum 
decisions,53 which are not critically analyzed by Lee in any of his briefing. 
In Liponis v. Bach, 149 ldaho 372,374,234 P.3d 696 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court 
dealt with a similarly challenged prose litigant, and held: 
These issue statements, filled with pseudo-legal hodgepodge and unintelligible 
verbiage, set the stage for [Appellant's] arguments. Because an appellant brief is 
a communication, the writer typically seeks to be understood, in order that the 
writer may persuade. However, [Appellant] appears to believe the purpose of a 
brief to be obscure and esoteric. Accordingly, we will not consider [Appellants] 
claims on appeal because he has failed to support them with either relevant 
argument and authority or coherent thought. 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted) 
The remaining issues, as defined by Lee, are inadequately set forth, and addressing each 
by separate legal argument would be a waste of time and hopefully, unnecessary. To the extent a 
53 R. Vol. 3, p. 508-522; Vol. 1, p. 176-183. 
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response is required, Young hereby adopts and incorporates the reasoning set forth in Judge 
Mitchell's Memorandum decisions. 54 
V. CONCLUSION 
Young requests that this Court deny Lee's appeal. Young further requests that this Court 
award him attorney fees and costs under LC.§§ 12-120 and 121. 
Dated: May 4, 2012 
MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of May, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document and a CD containing a searchable PDF of the foregoing 
document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Terry-Lee, a Sovereign Being 
c/o Box [1084], by Necessity 
Loon-Lake, non-domestic 
Washington, de j ure, state 
54 R. Vol. 3, p. 508-522; Vol. 1, p. 176-183. 
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